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Environmental regulations often require  that polluting agents comply with certain 
norms, which range from the installation of adequate pollution control devices in the 
initial stages of their production process, to the requirement that they do not exceed 
the recommended pollution limits or standards while engaging in their production 
activities.  Normally, authorities may not observe the performance of firms with respect 
to such laws, particularly, whether they comply or not with the pollution limits, unless 
they engage in costly inspection processes.  Therefore, together with the determination 
of standards, regulators design monitoring policies,  which depend not only on their 
costs but also on the standards to be enforced.  These policies basically consist of 
frequencies  of inspection to verify firms'  behavior,  and sanctions to be imposed if 
firms are found to be violating the standards.1  However, even when such enforcement 
policies are specified, in reality we  observe that some firms comply with and others 
violate environmental laws. 
In this paper, we  investigate the aspects which may explain why some firms  do 
comply with the pollution standards and others do not. For that purpose, we consider 
a model in which the regulator sets a policy consisting of a pollution standard and a 
probability of inspection. If  a firm is discovered to be noncompliant with the standard, 
then it is forced to pay a sanction, which is strictly increasing and convex in the degree 
of violation.2 
The planner chooses the policy that maximizes social welfare, which we asswne de-
pends positively on the profits of the firm, and negatively on external costs. associated 
with pollution and monitoring costs.  "Ve adopt a principal-agent framework, in which 
the planner consid~rs the  optimal behavior of the firm with respect to each policy, and, 
in particular, whether the firm complies 'with the standard or does not. Therefore, we 
consider the full  range of policies,  that is,  those which induce compliance and those 
which induce noncompliance.  . 
Vve  first consider the case in which the planner has perfect information about the 
regulated agent.  "Ve  find  that the optimal policy can entail either compliance or 
noncompliance with the environmental standards, depending on the monitoring costs 
and the level and convexity of the sanctions.  In the second part of the p~per, we 
consider that the planner has imperfect information about the firm, and study which 
types are more likely to violate the standards, and the cases in which the optimal 
policy is either a separating or a uniform policy. 
.  1 In the U.S., some examples of these policies are those of the Mine Safety and Health Adminis-
tration and the Environmental Protection Agency's Uniform Civil Penalty Policy.  For the Spanish 
case, see the "Ley 20/86 de Residuos T6xicos y Urbanos" and the "Real Decreto 833/88 de Residuos 
T6xicos y UrbanOs"  . 
2This is the kind of  sanction currently employed in both the Spanish and the American legislations. 
For instance, in the Spanish case, violations are clasified into three categories (leves, graves and muy 
graves) while s~nctions increase more than proportiop.ally across groups. 
2 Downing and vVatson  (1974)  were  the first  to point out the necessity of incor-
porating enforcement costs into' the analysis of regulatory policy, although they did 
not explicitly derive the optimal policy combining regulatory standards, inspection 
probabilities and fines.  There are some papers in the literature on standard-setting 
which study the optimal response of the firm to the standard, under given monitoring 
policies: such as  Harford (1978),  Jones (1989) or Kambhu (1989).  However, none of 
them considers the optimal policy.  Moreover,  all these papers consider only a  rep-
resentative agent.  By contrast, Viscusi  and Zeckhauser (1979)  consider the setting 
of the regulatory policy for  a group of heterogeneous firms,  but with an exogenous 
monitoring policy and constraining the policy to be uniform. 
There are some recent papers which determine the optimal regulatory policy (that 
is, standards together with monitoring policies) but restricting attention to the subset 
of policies "'hich induce compliance.  Therefore, these papers are not able to explain 
noncompliance.  Examples include Ellis (1992), who considers several agents and allows 
for nonuniform policies: and Amacher and Malik (1996), who consider a representative 
agent. 
Other "'orks consider an exogenous standard and determine the optimal monitor-
ing policy:  without  restricting attention to policies which induce compliance.  Thil? 
approach is considered in the literature on crime, starting with Becker (1968), where 
the standard is taken to be not commiting a certain action.  The main advantage of our 
approach versus this literature is, therefore, that, in ours, the standard is determined 
wi thin the model. 
Becker (1968) was the first who proved the optimality of imposing maximal fines, 
giyen  costly enforcement.  Subsequently,  there have been several, papers explaining 
the reasons why:  in fact: fines  are not maximal:  agents's risk aversion (Polinski and 
Shavell (1979)): agents's imperfect information about the regulatory policy (Bebchuk 
and Kaplo,,· (1991): Kaplow (1990)), agents' differences in wealth (Polinski and Shavell 
(1991))  or marginal  deterrence  (Shavell  (1992)),  among others.  In this paper, we 
propose an alternative explanation for the fact that fines are not maximal, namely the 
consideration that the planner has incomplete information about the technological 
characteristics of the agents.3  . 
In the environmental context, there are other papers that consider the determi-
nation of optimal pollution taxes (as opposed to standards), inspection probabilities 
and fines  for  ~'eporting false  pollution levels  (see, for  instance: Ortuiio-Ortfn (1992), 
.  3In our context, the maximum fine is considered to be the imposition of a zero standard, when 
the optimal policy entails noncompliance.  We show that, when the planner does not have perfect 
information about the characteristics of the agents, it is never optimal to set a zero standard for all 
the types.  An important difference between our approach and theirs is also that we consider that 
fines depend on the degree of violation and are continuous.  Therefore, fines are very small for very 
small violations.  Howeyer, the literature on crime considers fixed  fines,  which are discontinuous at 
zero. 
3 Swierzbinski (1994)).  Since they consider taxes, they explicitly assume that all pol-
lution levels should be punishable.  That is,  in the terminology of our paper, they 
assume a zero standard. However, in this paper, we derive the conditions under which 
it is optimal to impose either a zero or a positive standard. 
Finally, the literature on tax evasion also presents similarities with our approach. 
There, reporting the true income level is the nonpunishable behavior.  The main ob-
jective of this literature is the determination of optimal policies which combine income 
taxes, inspection probabilities and fines.  Reinganum and Wilde (1985, 1986) were the 
first  who allowed for  the inspection probability to depend on reported income, and 
the first who showed that the optimal inspection probability is a decreasing function 
of reported income.  This result continues to hold when we consider a hierarchical gov-
ernment (Sanchez and Sobel (1993)) or heterogeneous income sources (Macho-Stadler 
and Perez-Castrillo (1994)).  For the several types model considered here, we obtain 
that the optimal probability is decreasing in reported type, a result which preserves 
the same spirit as the result for the tax evasion context. 
Here, we  first consider the complete information case.  By this we  mean that the 
planner knows the profit function of the firm, although it has to inspect its behavior 
as a means of verification.  We consider this to be a "realistic" benchmark, recognizing 
that inspections are necessary to enforce the desired behavior of the agents. We show 
that the optimal policy may induce the agents to either comply with or violate the 
standards.  In any event, the pollution level induced by the optimal policy is always 
larger than the efficient pollution level, that is, the level that maximizes social welfare 
in  the hypothetical case that enforcement  were  costless.  Therefore,  there exists a 
trade-off between efficiency and monitoring costs:  the higher the monitoring costs, 
the larger the difference between the efficient pollution level arid the pollution level 
. induced by the optimal policy. 
\\Then the optimal policy entails noncompliance, we show that the optimal standard 
in the complete information model is zero.  This result is due to the fact that, given a 
sanction dependent on the degree of violation and given a pollution level, the maximum 
fine is obtained with a zero standard. And imposing maximum fines allows the planner 
to save monitoring costs.  At the same time, this result suggests that there are cases 
in which  a  probabilistic pollution tax is  preferred, from  a  social viewpoint,  to the 
imposition of a standard. 
\Vhether the optimal policy entails compliance or noncompliance depends on the 
monitoring costs and the level of the sanctions.  Regarding the former, we show that 
it is more likely that the optimal policy entails noncompliance when monitoring costs 
are high.  This result is reasonable, reflecting the fact that when inspections are very 
costly, t.he monitoring policy may not be enough to induce the agent to comply with 
the regulation. 
With respect to the lattel:' we  find that, surprisingly,  it is  more likely that the 
optimal policy entails noncompliance when sanctions are sufficiently high.  In fact, 
4 , 
this  result is  contrary to that which  the literature on either crime or tax evasion 
predicts, where an increase in the sanction increases compliance.  However, note that, 
there, the standard -i.e., the level which delimits a certain behavior to be punishable 
or not- is  given.  Here, the standard is determined endogenously in the model, and 
therefore, it changes when there is a change in the level of the sanctions.  . 
The explanation of the result is  as follows.  The social welfare evaluation of each 
policy is  determined by the agent's induced behavior to such a policy -i.e., the pol-
lution level selected by the firm in response to a standard and an inspection policy-
and the monitoring costs.  In our model, each possible pollution level e can be induced 
by two kinds of policies:  the first is a  compliant policy, which consists of announcing 
a standard equal to such pollution level and the probability of inspection necessary to 
induce the agent to comply with the standard.  The second is  a noncompliant policy, 
which consists of announcing a standard equal to zero and the probability of inspec-
tion that induces the agent to pollute at level e.  Between the two, the cheapest policy 
is  the one with the lowest inspection probability.  \Vhen the sanctions increase,  the 
degree of noncompliance to a given standard decreases, and, given the convexity of the 
sanctions, the lower the standard, the more it decreases.  Therefore, the probability 
needed to induce a certain pollution level e decreases in both types of policies, but it 
decreases more in the one associated with the noncompliant policy.  Consequently, for 
sufficiently high sanctions, this implies the setting of an optimal policy that entails 
noncompliance. 
To our knowledge, only Kambhu (1989)  derives a conclusion similar to ours, that 
is, the fact that an increase in the fines may increas~ noncompliance, although using 
the assumption that the agent can spend resources to evade penalties if it is  caught 
violating the regulation.  However, as we have already discussed, Kambhu (1989) does 
. not address the issue of optimality of the regulatory policy. 
In the complete information model, we obtain that, whenever there is noncompli-
ance, the optimal standard is zero.  In practice, however, we  find situations in which 
firms violate positive standards. Therefore, although the model is able to explain the 
feature that there are firms that violate regulations, nevertheless it is incomplete, since 
it cannot explain violations of positive standards. In the sec;:ond part of the paper, we 
show that the result depends crucially on the assumption of complete information. 
Generally, firms  are better informed than planners with respect to their techno-
logical  charac~eristics. Due to this lack of information, authorities periodically collect 
information from the firms,  regarding their production processes, methods for  recy-
cling wastes, etc.4  Here, we assume that the agent first announces a report of its type, 
~nd contingent on the report,  the planner then sets the optimal regulatory policy. 
By the revelatiQn principle,we can restrict attention to incentive-compatible policies, 
that is, ·policies which induce the agents to r~veal their true types.  For simplicity, we 
consider a model of two typ~ and we find that the optimal policy can either induce 
"'For instance, in the Spanish legislation, firms are·asked to complete annual reports. 
5 both types to comply with the standard, induce the dirtiest type (i.e., the one which 
imposes the greatest pollution cost) not to comply, or induce both types to violate the 
standard. \Ve show that if the optimal policy entails full compliance, it can only be a 
pooling policy, that is, the same policy for both types.  However, if the optimal policy 
entails either full noncompliance or partial compliance, it must be' a separating policy, 
which implies both a lower standard and inspection probability for the dirtiest type. 
As a consequence, a policy which implies a standard equal to zero for all the types is 
never optimal. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we present 
the model.  In Section 3,  we  study the optimal behavior of the firm  with respect 
"  to each feasible  policy.  In Section 4,  we  analyze the optimal policy in the complete 
information case.  In Section 5, we  investigate the asymmetric information case.  \-Ve 
conclude in Section 6. 
2. A  Basic Regulatory Model 
We consider a firm that generates pollution as a by-product of its production activity  .. 
The relation between production and pollution is monotonic, that is, the higher the 
production le,'el, the higher the generated pollution. The firm obtains private profits 
dependent on the pollution level e 2::  0, and represented by the function b (e),  where 
b (e)  is such th8:t b' (e)  > 0,  b" (e)  <·0',  bill (e)  =  0 and b (0)  =  0.5,6 
Pollution generates external damage~  measured by the function d (e), whered' (e) > 
0, d" (e)  > 0 and d (0) = O. 
\Ve assume that the planner cannot observe the pollution level selected by the firm, 
unless it engages in a monitoring activity, which is costly and perfectly accurate. The 
cost per inspection is c > o. 
The planner sets a standard, that is, a maximum level of permitted pollution, rep-
resented by s  ~  O.  In order to discover the performance of the firm with respect to the 
standard, the firm has to be inspected. However, since this is a costly activity, it will 
generally not be desirable to inspect the firm in every instance but only occasionally. 
Therefore, the planner also sets the probability of inspecting the firm, represented by 
pE [0,1].  Once inspected, if the firm is discovered to be in violation of the prescribed 
standard, Le.)f e > s, then it is forced to pay a penalty, which depends on the degree 
of  noncompliance~ e - s.  Formally, the sanction takes the following structure: 
.  5For functions of one variable, we use the prime notation to denote derivatives.  For functions of 
several variables, we use subscripts to denote partial derivatives. 
6It may be more realistic to assume that profits for the firm are strictly concave in the production 
level  (and, therefore, in  the pollution level)  and have an interior maximum.  This does not affect 
the qualitative nature of our results.  When approp~iate, we will discuss the differences between one 
assumption ,"ersus the other.  .  . 
6 I (e - s) = { ~  (e - s)  e>s 
e:5s  (2.1) 
where  F (e - s)  is  such  that F' (e - s)  >  0,  F" (e - s)  >  0,  Fill (e - s)  = 0  and 
F (0) = 0.7  We also assume that F'  ~  2e~8.8 We assume that the·sanction is fixed by 
a goverment entity other than the regulator, for example, the judiciary.9 
We consider a principal-agent framework in which the planner (principal) chooses 
the social welfare maximizing regulatory policy considering the optimal response of 
the firm  (agent) to a given policy. 
Given a policy {s:p}, the firm then chooses the pollution level that maximizes its 
expected payoff: that is: its private profits minus its expected penalties: which can be 
represented by the following expression: 
P{s:p) =  ~tt{b(e) - pI{e - s)}  (2.2) 
Let e (s,p)  be the pollution level  chosen by the firm given the policy {s,p}, i.e., 
e (s:p)  =  argmax€~Q  {b (e) - pi (e - s)}.  Given the concavity of the maximand in 
(2.2),  e (s,p)  is  unique, except when the agent is  indifferent between complying and 
not complying with the standard. In this latter case, we assume that the agent chooses 
to comply.  IQ  . 
Considering the optimal response of the firm to a given policy,  the planner now 
chooses  the regulatory policy that maximizes social  welfare.  We  define  the social 
welfare function to be as follows: 
SlY (s:p)  =  P (s,p) - d (e (s,p)) +  pi  (e (s,p) "'-.8) - pc 
(2.3) 
Thus, in the social welfare evaluation, the planner is concerned about the expected 
payoff of the firm,  the generated damages,  the expected collected fines  and the ex-
pected monitoring costs.  Observe that we are assuming that there are no social costs 
'iThe results presented in the paper also hold for bill and F"' suffic;iently small. 
8 As we show in Section 3, this condition is sufficient for concentrating on first order conditions. 
9This assumption is common in the literature in this context.  Although the task of determining 
the optimal shape of the sanction together with the standard and the probability of inspection is quite 
challenging: the. problem is very difficult and has not been solved.  In other contexts, such as crime 
(where, as opposed to our model, the standard is exogenous) there are several papers devoted to the 
task of endogellizing fines together with probabilities of inspection, starting with Becker (1968), and 
continuing with Polinsky and Shavell (1979, 1990) and Bebchuck and Kaplow (1991), among others. 
In the context of tax evasion, few  papers consider endogenous fines.  See, for  instance, Mookherjee 
and Png (1989)  and Pestieau et a1.  (1997).  However, all these papers consider that sanctions are 
constant; that is, independent on the degree of violation. 
lOThis assumption is quite com~on  in, the principal-agent literature.  That is,  when the agent is 
indifferent between taking two possible actions, it is assumed that it selects the most preferred from 
the principal's viewpoint.  . 
7 associated with the collection of the fines,  and that fines are redistributed lump-sum, 
that is,  they do not distort behavior.  Also,  note that we  do not impose any bud-
get requirement on the monitoring activity.  \Vhen appropriate, we  will  discuss the 
implications of relaxing these assumptions. 
In the next section, we study the induced beha\;or of the firm'with respect to the 
announced policy. 
3. The Optimal Behavior of the Firm 
Consider a  feasible  policy  {s:p}, that is,  one  such that s  ~ 0  and p  E  [0,1].  As· 
explained in the pre\;ous Section, this policy provides an expected payoff to the firm, 
which is given by the following expression: 
p (s,p) =  ~:l  {b (e) - pf  (e - s)} 
where, f (e - s)  is given by (2.1). 
(3.1) 
Therefore, when the firm complies with the standard, it does not incur any penalty. 
That is, when e ~  s, its payoff is b (e).  Since b (e) is strictly increasing in e, the optimal 
compliance decision is  s,  i.e., the maximum permitted level, and its payoff is b (s). 
However, when the firm  pollutes more than the prescribed standard, i.e., e > s, 
there exists a probability that the firm is inspected ·and punished. In this case, its ex-
pected payoff is b (e) - pF (e - s).  Consequently, the optimal noncompliance decision is 
n (s,p) =  argmax€~o  {b (e) - pF (e - s)}, whenever n (s,p) > s, and the correspond-
ing payoff is 7i (s,p) =  max€~o  {b (e) - pF (e - sHY By'assumption, the maximand is 
strictly concave in e.  Therefore, assuming an interior solution, the first order condition 
. characterizes the optimal noncompliance decision., which is the followi~g: 
b' (e)  =  pF' (e - s)  (3.2) 
Implicitly differentiating (3.2), we obtain np (s,p) =  bll!;FII and ns (s,p) =  - bl/P!;~II' 
\Ve  then have np (s,p) < 0 and 0 < ns (s,p) < 1.  That is, the pollution level selected 
by the firm  in  the event of noncompliance  decreases  as the probability of. inspec-
tion increases,  and increases as the prescribed standard increases.  However,  since 
ns (s:p) < 1, the degree of violation decreases as the prescribed standard increases. 
Given a policy {s:p}, the firm selects whether to comply or not depending on the 
expected payoff of each of these possibilities.  Thus, the optimal response of the firm 
to a given policy can be represented by the following expression: 
e (s,p) =  {  ~  (s,p) 
b (s)  ~  7r (s,p) 
b (s)  < 7i (s,p) 
11 Of course, if n (s,p) turns to b~ lower than s, the firm is actually complying and therefore, the 
corresponding payoff is b (n (s,p».  . 
8 
\ And,  the expected payoff of the firm  to a  given  policy  (given by (3.1))  can be 
further expressed as follows: 
p (s,p) = max  {b (s),,, (s,p))  (3.4) 
In the follo\\;ng Lemma, we show the properties of the function P (s,p). 
Lemma 3.1.  The function P (s, p) is strictly increasing and concave in s, nonincreas-
ing and convex in p,  and has a nonnegative cross partial.  :Moreover, limp-to P (s,p) = 
oc  for all s? 0,  and lims--+oo P(s,p) = 00 for all pE [0,1]. 
Proof.  To pro\"e the first part of the Lemma, observe that, when P(s,p) =  b(s), the 
result is  tri\;al.  \Vhen P (s,p) = ,,(s,p) = maxe~o  {b (e) - pP (e - s)}, we have the 
following: 
"$ (s,p) =  ppl (n(s,p) - s) > 0  (3.5) 
"ss (s,p) = pF" (n (s,p) - s) (ns (s,p) - 1) < 0  (3.6) 
"p (s,p) = - P (n (s,p) - s) < 0  (3.7) 
"pp (s,p) = _pI (n (s,p) - s) np (s,p) > 0  (3.8) 
"sp =  FI (n (s,p) - s) + pP" (n (s,p) - s) np (s,p) > 0  (3.9) 
as desired. 
To prove the second part, note that, for  all s?  0,  we have limp-to" (s,p)  =  00 > 
b (s).  Thus: limp--+o P (s,p)  = 00.  Also,  for  all p E  [0, I], lims-too b (s)  = 00, which 
implies that lims  ..... oc P (s,p) = 00 .• 
\Ve  now characterize the set of policies such that the firm is  indifferent between 
comply;ng and noncomplying.  This is given by the following equation: 
b (s)  = ,,(s,p)  (3.10) 
Observe that this expression defines an implicit relationship between p and s, i.e., 
a  mapping pc (s)  such that (3.10)  holds.  In  the following  Lemma,  we  present its 
properties. 
Lemma 3.2.  The mapping pc (s)  is strictly decreasing and convex in s.  Moreover, 
lims  ..... o pc (s)  -...:.  00 an  d lims--+oo pc (  s) =  o. 
Proof. Implicitly differentiatiating (3.10), we obtain the following: 
Cl ()  bl (s) - "s (s,p)  p  s  =~~~~~~ 
7rp (s,p) 
(3.11) 
~ote that the denominator of (3.11)  is negative, by (3.7).  To determine the sign 
of the numerator, observe that, from  (3.2) arid (3.5), we  have 7rs (s,p) = 1/ (n).  Also, 
9 as n (s,p) > sand b is strictly concave, we have b' (s) > b' (n).  Thus, the numerator 
of (3.11) is positive, and therefore, (3.11) is negative. 
To prove the strict convexity, differentiate (3.11) with respect to s to obtain:12 




Observe that the sign of (3.12) is fully determined by the sign of the numerator. 
The first expression in brackets in the numerator can be expressed, using (3.6),  (3.9) 
and (3.11), in the following way: 
1  [b" (s)(b" (n) - pFI/) F + 
[b" (n) - pFI/] F  . 
pF"b" (n) F + F'bl/ (n) (b' (s) - pF')]  (3.13) 
The second expression in brackets in the numerator of (3.12)  can be expressed, 
using (3.8), (3.9) and (3.11), as follows: 
liSp +  IIpppCI (s)  =  [b" (n)  ~  pFI/1 p[F'b" (n) F + (F')2 (b' (s) - pF')1 
(3.14) 
Therefore, from (3.13) and (3.14), it is easy to see that the numerator of (3.12) is 
positive, considering (3.2) and the fact that b' > 0, lJl < 0, F' ~  2e~s and F" > o. 
The second part of the Lemma follows easily from (3.10), the properties of 7r (s,p) 
. presented in ~-emma 3.1, and the fact that b (0) =  0 and lims_oob (s) =  00 .• 
In Figure 1, we represent the function pC (s)  in the space of feasible policies (s,p). 
':Ye  also  include the indifference map for  the firm,  where each indifference curve is 
composed of the set of policies {s,p} which give the firm  the same expected payoff. 
On the horizontal axis, we measure the standard and on Hie vertical axis we measure 
the probability of inspection. 
The function pC (s) has a natural interpretation: for a given standard s, pC (s) gives 
the minimum' probability of inspection necessary to induce the firm to comply with 
the standard. Concerning the shape of the function pC (s), since profits for the firm are 
strictly increasing and concave in the pollution level, enforcing a higher pollution level 
entails less monitoring effort than enforcing a lower pollution level; also, the probability 
of inspection decreases more than proportionally when the standard increases.  Above 
the curve pC (s),  the agent strictly prefers to comply with the regJ.Ilation;  and below 
12We have omitted arguments for e8se of exposition. 
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pC (s), the agent strictly prefers not to comply.  Consequently, pc (s)  divides the space 
of feasible policies into two regions,  namely the compliance and the noncompliance 
regions. 
In the compliance region,  the firm's expected payoff is b (8),  that is, it does not 
depend on the probability of inspection. Therefore, in that region,' indifference curves 
have an infinite slope. In the noncompliance region, the expected payoff is 7r (s,p) and 
the indifference curves are strictly increasing and convex.I3  Moreover, by Lemma 3.1, 
the expected payoff of the firm increases to the southeast, i.e., wheneyer the standard 
is higher and the probability of inspection is lower.I4 
In Figure 2, we represent the firm's optimal response to each feasible policy, or the 
firm's  beha'l.lioral loci.  On the horizontal axis, we  measure the pollution level chosen 
by the firm and, on the vertical axis, we measure the probability of inspection. 
Consider, for  instance, a  standard s.  From the previous analysis,  there exists a 
probability of inspection pc (s) such that, for all p ~  pc (s), the optimal response of the 
agent is e =  s, i.e., to comply with the standard. At p =  pc (s),  the agent is actually 
indifferent between complying and not complying, i.e., between choosing either s or 
n (s, pc (s))  =  arg  maxe~o  {b (e) - pc (s) F (e - s)}, where n (s, pc (s))  > s.  Therefore, 
behavior is discontinuous at p =  pc (s).  Finally, for p < pc (s),  the optimal response 
of the agent is  to violate the standard, i.e., e =  n (s,p),  which is strictly decreasing 
and convex in the probability of inspection.  IS  Given s,  ~  (e)  denotes the inverse of 
the function n (s,p), and represents the probability' necessary to induce the pollution 
leyel e,  under the standard s,  where e > s.  Since n (s,p)  is strictly decreasing and 
conyex in p, the inverse function ~  (e)  is also strictly decreasing and convex in e. 
Consider now an alternative standard s,  such that s  > s.  On the one hand, by 
L-emma 3.2, the minimum probability necessary to induce the agent to comply with s 
. is lower than that necessary to induce the agent to comply with s, i.e., pc (8) < pc (s). 
At P  =  pc (8),  analogously,  there exists  a  discontinuity.  And for  p  <  pc (s),  the 
13To see the shape of an indifference curve in the noncompliance region, we implicitly differentiate 
the equation ii  (s,p) = b  (n (s,p)) - pF  (n (s,p) - s) =  k to obtain: 
dp  I,,-k= pF' (n (s,p) - s)  > 0 
ds'- F (n (s,p) - s) 
(3.15) 
And, differentiating (3.15) with respect to s we have: 
tPp I  F' dp  I  P  (  /I  I  2)  )  ds2  1r=k=  F  ds  1r=k +  F2  F  F - (F)  (ns  ~  1  > 0  (3.16) 
since ns < 1 and (F')2 - FF/I > O. 
14 If,  alternatively, we assume that private profits for  the firm  have an interior maximum e,  the 
function pC (s)  is equal to zero at s =  e.  Observe that, in this case, the agent is indifferent between 
a policy such that s = e  and any policy such that s > e  ,  since in this latter case, the agent chooses 
e.  As  we  will' see in the next Section, this possibility does not affect the qualitative nature of the 
optimal policy. .  . 
lSnpp (s,p) > 0 since bill =  0 and Fill =  O. 
11 agent's optimal choice is  to violate  s,  i.e.,  e  =  n (s,p).  Finally,  since the optimal 
noncompliance decision increases as the standard level increases, we  then have that 
n (s,p) > n (s,p), for all p < pC (s).  Therefore, we have that ~  (e) < ~  (e), for all e. 
Once we  have studied the optimal response of the firm to ea~  feasible policy, in 
the next section we analyze the features of the optimal regulatory policy in the basic 
model. 
4. The Optimal Policy in the Basic Model 
As described in Section 2, the pla:q.ner anticipates the optimal response of the firm to 
a given policy, and takes this into account when selecting an optimal policy.  Given 
the definition of social welfare presented in (2.3), the planner then solves the following 
problem: 
maxS~V  (s:p) = P (s,p) - d (e) + pf  (e - s) - cp 
8.P 
(4.1) 
where P (s,p) is given by (3.4) and e = e (s,p) is given by (3.3). 
Considering (3.3) and (3.4), we can reduce (4.1) to the following expression: 
max {b (e) - d (e) - cp} 
8.P 
subject to e =  e (s,p)  (4.2) 
where e (s:p) is  given by (3.3).  Observe that, since fines  are transfers, they do not 
appear directly in  the objective function  in (4.2).  But,  of course,  they affect  the 
induced behavior of the agent, given by e =  e (s,p). 
\Ve do not restrict attention to the subset of policies which induce compliance, but 
we  allow for the full  range of policies.  Therefore, the planner can choose the policy 
to be in  either the compliance or the noncompliance  regions,  depending on which 
provides the highest expected social welfare. 
Let  eTJ.O  denote the efficient pollution level, that is: e
W  =  argmaxe~o  {b (e) - d (e)}. 
Also, we denote by pn (e)  the probability needed to induce the pollution level e under 
the standard s =  0,  that is  pn (e) =  Po (e).  In the next proposition, we  characterize 
the optimal policy in the basic model. 
Proposition ·4.1.  In  the basic model:  the optimal policy (s*,p*)  may entail either 
compliance or noncompliance. 
(i) 'When it entails compliance, s* > e
W  and p*  < pC (e
W
). 
(ii) When it en~ails noncompliance, s*  =  0, p*  < pn (e
W
)  and e(O,p*) > e
W
• 
Proof. To solve (4.2), we first restrict attention to the subset of policies which induce 
compliance and obtain the constrained optimUm.  \Ve then concentrate on the subset 
12 of policies which induce noncompliance and obtain the corresponding optimum.  The 
global maximum is then the one which yields the highest expected social welfare. 
We first solve the problem restricting attention to the subset of policies that entail 
compliance, that is: 
max  {b (e) - d (e) - cp} 
S,P 
subject to b (s)  ;:::  'ii (s,p)  (4.3) 
The optimal response of the firm in this case is  e (s,p)  =  s,  i.e.,  to comply with 
the standard. Thus, an equivalent formulation for  (-1.3)  is the following: 
ma.'(  {b (s) - d (  s) - cp} 
S,P 
subject to p ;:::  pC (s)  (4.4) 
At the optimum, it is clear that the restriction in (4.4) is binding, since the cheap-
est way  to enforce a  given  standard is  with the minimum neccesary probability of 
inspection.  Thus, problem (4.4) can be further reduced to the following problem: 
max {b (s) - d (s) - cpc (s)} 
S  (4.5.) 
Observe that the maximand in  (4.5)  is  strictly concave,  by Lemma 3.2.  Thus, 
the first order condition in (4.5) characterizes the interior optimum in the compliance 
regIon: 
b' (s*) - d' (s*)  =  cpcJ (s*)·  (4.6) 
By Lemma 3.2, we know that pcJ (s)  < O.  Therefore, we have b' (s*) - d' (s*)  < 0, 
which implies s*  > e
W  and, therefore, p. < pC (ew).16 
Next, constrained to the subset of policies that·entail noncompliance, the problem 
is the following: 
max 
S,P  b (e) - d (e) - cp 
subject to e = n (s,p)  (4.7) 
where n (s: p)  is again the optimal response of the firm in the event of noncompliance. 
The optimality conditions for problem (4.7) are the following: 17 
(b' (e) - d' (e)) np (s,p)  =  c 
(b' (e) - d' (e)) ns (s,p)  <  0 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
I61n the event that p > 1, the optimal policy is p  •. = 1 and s' such that p (s·) = 1. 
IiThese conditions are necessary. and sufficient for characterizing the optimum, since epp (s,p) > 0 
and e SB (s,p) =0, for b'" =  0 and F'" =  O. 
13 Since np (s,p)  < 0,  an interior solution implies, by (4.8), that b' (e)  - d' (e)  < O. 
Therefore, since ns (s,p) > 0,  we have that (4.9) is negative. 
Consequently, by (4.9), we obtain s· =  O.  And, since li (e)  - d' (e)  < 0, we  have 
e (O,p·) > e
W  and, therefore, p. < pn (e
W
), as desired .• 
In Figures 3 and 4,  we  represent, respectively, the optimal policy entailing either 
compliance or noncompliance.  On the horizontal axis, we measure the pollution level 
and on the vertical axis we measure the probability of inspection.  In both graphs, we 
represent the map of iso-welfare contours for the planner, which are composed of the 
set of pairs pollution level - probability of inspection where social welfare is constant. 




In both figures,  we  also represent the optimal response of the firm  to each feasi-
ble policy.  From the analysis in the previous section, we  can see  that each possible 
pollution level e can be induced by two kinds of policies.  On the one hand, the plan-
ner might announce a  compliant policy,  that is, a standard s =  e and the minimum 
probability of inspection necessary to induce the agent to comply with the standard, 
given by pc (e).  On the other hand, it is  possible to announce a  noncompliant policy 
that consists of a standard s = 0 and the probability necessary to induce the pollutio,n 
level e under s =  0, given by pn (e).  Thus, pn (e)  represents the minimum probability 
necessary to induce the agent to pollute the level e in the event of noncompliance.19 
Both functions pc (e)  and pn (e)  are strictly decreasing and convex in e,  as shown 
in Section 3.  The feature that both functions cross in the way depicted in Figures 3 
and 4 is established in Lemma 4.2, below. 
Observe that, by (4.6), the optimal policy entailing compliance occurs at the point 
of tangency between an iso-welfare contour and the function pc (e).  By <::ont~a.st, the 
optimal policy entailing noncompliance occurs at the point of tange'ncy between an 
iso-welfare contour and the function pn (e). 
Proposition 4.1 shows that, whenever monitoring is  costly, the optimal policy al-
ways  results  in  inducing the agent to overpollute,  i.e.,  to choose  a  pollution level 
larger than the efficient level e
W
•  Therefore, there exists a,  tradeoff between efficiency 
18To  see this,  we  implicitly differentiate the equation b (e) - d (e)  - cp = k  to obtain *  Ik= 
b/(e)~d/(e), which is  positive for  e < e
W
;  equal to 0 for  e = eW
;  and negative for e > e
W
•  Moreover, 
~  Ik= b" (e) .( O. 
19Note that the pollution le\'el chosen by the firm  in the event of rioncompliance increases as the 
,prescribed standard increases, and it decreases as the probability of inspection increases.  Therefore, 
if we assume that the policy {s, p},  for  s > 0, leads the agent to choose a  pollution level e larger 
than s, then ther,e exists another policy, where both p and s are lower, and such that it induces the 
agent to select the same pollution level.  Clearly, the second policy is cheaper than the first one, since 
the probability of inspection is lower (see Figure 2).' Thus, following this reasoning and subsequently 
reducing {s, p}, we have that the cheapest way to induce the agent to pollute a certain level e is with 
a standard s = 0 and the probability of inspection given by the function e = n (O,p), that is, p'" (e). 
14 and monitoring costs; at the optimum, the marginal loss in efficiency is equal to the 
marginal savings in monitoring costs.  Observe that this result is true independently 
of whether the policy entails compliance or noncompliance, as expressed, respectively, 
in (4.6) and (4.8). 
It can be easily verified, using both (4.6)  and (4.8), that when monitoring costs 
increase,  the new optimal policy results in  a  lower  probability of inspection and a 
higher chosen  pollution level.  Graphically,  an increase in monitoring costs can be 
represented by flatter iso-welfare contours and no change in the firm's behavioralloci. 
Proposition 4.1  establishes that the optimal policy may entail either compliance 
or noncompliance.20  We  are now interested in analyzing the factors that influence 
which is the case. It is important to point out that the situations depicted in Figures 
3 and 4 are not the only ones we may have.  There can be cases in which the function 
pC (e)  lies either above or below the function pn (e),  depending on the convexity of the 
sanctions.  But if the functions cross, they do so as indicated. 
Lemma 4.2.  When sanctions are linear, pc (e)  > pn (e)  for all e.  However, when sanc-
tions are strictly convex, pc (e)  and pn (e)  cross once and, at the point of  intersection, 
pn' (e)  < pC' (e)  < O. 
Proof. To prove the first part, note that, when F (e - s) is linear, we have ns (s,p)  . 
- bllP!;~1I  =  o.  Consider a policy (s,p) such that p =  pc (s).  Given (s,p), we have that 
n (s,p) = argmaxe~o  {b (e) - pF (e - s)} > s.  And: since ns (s,p) = 0, we  have that 
n (O,p)  > s, which impliespn (e) < pc (e),  as desired. 
Consider an increase in the convexity of the sanctioris.  Now, we have ns (s,p) > o. 
Also, the higher the degree of convexity, the higher ns (s,p).  Consider again a policy 
(s,p) such that p =  pc (s).  An increase in convexity of the sanction,S implies that both 
n (s,p)  and n (O,p)  decrease, since  the marginal sanction increaseS.  However,  since 
the higher the convexity, the higher ns (s,p), n (O,p)  decreases more.  Also, since the 
degree of convexity has increased, n (s,p) - s is now lower.  All this means that both 
pC (e)  and pn (e)  move to the left, but the variation of pn (e)  is larger.  Therefore, the 
two functions must cross. 
2ONote that, throughout the paper, we maintain the assumption that the planner commits to the 
announced regulatory policy, that is, he monitors the firm with the announced frequency, even when, 
in some instances, he would find it profitable to deviate from the announced policy.  For example, in 
the complete information model, the planner knows the response of the firm to every policy.  If  the 
announced policy entails compliance, the planner knows that the firm complies with the standard. 
Then, the planner could decide not to monitor the firm, since it is a worthless effort, given the fact 
that he is not going to collect any money from penalties.  \Ve justify the assumption of commitment 
considering that the planner has to build up a  reputation, that is,  he has to make his policy an-
nouncements credible among the agents to induce the desired behavior.  A formal justification of this 
assumption would require the consideration of a dynamic model, which is beyond the scope of this 
paper. In static models such as ours, the assumption of commitment is common in the literature. As 
an example of the case of noncomitment, see Ellis (lQ92). 
15 Let  (e,p)  be a  point of intersection  between  pC (e)  and pn (e).  At  that point, 
considering (3.2), (3.5), (3.7) and (3.11), the slope of the function pC (e)  is as follows: 
c' (_)  b' (e) - b' (n (e,p))  p  e  =-
F (n (e,p) - e) 
(4.10) 
By (3.10) and the fact that b'"  =  0,  (4.10) can be expressed as follows: 
c' (e) = _b" (e) (n (e,p) - e) 
p  p b (n (e, 15»  - b (e) 
(4.11) 
Xo\\",  considering (3.2),  the optimal response of the agent when s  =  0,  i.e.,  e = 
n (O,p),  is  giYen  by the equation b' (e)  = pF' (e).  Implicitly differentiating in this 
equation and evaluating at the crossing point (e,p), the slope of pn (e) is the following: 
n'  _  b" (e) - pF" (e) 
p  (e)  =  F' (e)  (4.12) 
Since b' (e)  =  pF' (e),  F'"  =  0 and b'" =  0, (4.12) can be expressed as follows: 
nt (_) _ _  2b" (e) 
p  e  - p  b' (e)  (4.13) 
Obserye that, to show that (4.11) is  larger than (4.13), it is enough to prove the 
following inequality: 
since b" < O. 
b' (e) < 2  b (n (e, p») - b (e) 
n(e,15)-e 
(4.14) 
Xote that, since ns (e,p)  <  1,  we  have that n (e,p)  - e < e.  Therefore,  since 
b"  < O.  we  have that  b(n(e}2)-~(e) >  b(2e).:-b(e).  And. sinc~ if' < 0 and 11"  - 0  we have 
.  n(e,p)-e  e'  , 
b(2e);b(€)  > b' (2e)  =  b/~, which proves (4.14) .• 
In the following  Lemma, we  show that the location of, the point of intersection 
depends on the level  of the sanctions.  It is  important to point out that, given  a 
strictly convex sanction, an increase in the level of the sanction implies that both the 
marginal sanction and the convexity of the sanction also increase, that is, both F' and 
F" increase. 
Lemma 4.3.  Given strictly convex sanctions,  when the sanction for noncompliance 
increases,  the new point of intersection  between pC (e)  and pn (e)  is such  that the 
standard is low~r and the probability of  inspection is higher. 
Proof.  Given a strictly convex sanction, let (e, p) be the point of in,tersection between 
pC (e) and pn (e).  Since the sanction is strictly convex, ,,:e have ns (e,p) =  - bllP!;~11 > O. 
Since an increase in the level  of the sanction' implies that both F' and F" increase, 
16 we  have that ns (e,p)  increases.  Also,  since F' increases,  both n (e,p)  and n (O,p) 
decrease,  by  (3.2).  But n (O,p)  decreases  more,  since ns (e,p)  increases  when  the 
sanction increases.  Also, n (e, p) - e decreases.  As a result, both pC (e)  and pn (e) move 
to the left, but the variation of pn (e)  at e is  larger.  Using Lemma 4.2, this implies 
that the new point of intersection entails a lower standard and a higher probability of 
inspection, as desired .• 
Combining Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3, we have the main result of this section: 
Proposition 4.4. In the basic model, when sanctions are linear in the degree of  viola-
tion: the optimal policy always entails compliance.  lVhen sanctions are strictly convex, 
the optimal policy entails noncompliance when the monitoring costs are sufficiently 
high: and also when the lelrel of  the sanctions is sufficiently high. 
The fact that we may have an optimal policy which entails noncompliance depends 
crucially on the convexity of the sanctions.  As  we  have shown, when sanctions are 
linear in the degree of violation, the optimal policy always entails compliance.21  How-
ever, when sanctions are strictly convex, the result depends both on the monitoring 
costs and the level of the sanctions. First, Proposition 4.4 shows that the optimal pol-
icy entails noncompliance when monitoring costs are high.  This result is  reasonable, 
reflecting the fact that when inspections are very costly, the monitoring policy may 
not be enotighto induce the agent to comply with th~ regulation. 
The proposition also shows that the optimal policy may entail noncompliance when 
the level of the sanction is also high.  As discussed in the Introduction, this result is 
contrary to the one predicted in the literature, which states that an increase in the 
level of the sandions increases compliance.  However, the main difference between our 
approach and the one followed  in the literature concerns the endogenization of the 
standard. 
~ote that we  have  assumed  in  (4.1)  that there is  no budgetary restriction on 
the monitoring activity.  If such a restriction existed: that is,  if the monitoring costs 
minus the expected collected fines could not exceed a certain bound, this would clearly 
decrease the optimal probability of inspection and increase the chosen pollution level. 
Therefore, for  a sufficiently high degree of punitiveness of the sanctions, this would 
induce setting the policy in the noncompliance region. 
21 This re;ult cIarifie; a point made in the literature that concentrate; only on the subset of policie; 
which  induce compliance.  For example, Amacher and Malik  (1996) assume linear fines  and argue 
that restricting attention to this subset of policies may be overstating enforcement costs.  By this, 
they mean that there may be a policy entailing noncompliance that induce; the agent to choose the 
same pollution level with a lower probability of inspection.  However, we have shown that when fines 
are linear,  the·  optimal policy aJways  entails compliance.  Therefore, there is  no overstatement of 
enforcement costs, since the set of policies that entaii compliance is the appropriate set to consider. 
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Summarizing, in this Section we  have shown that the optimal policy can entail 
noncompliance.  Therefore,  in  contrast to the existing literature, the model is  able 
to explain the fact that some firms  violate regulations.  While the model captures 
this salient feature of environmental regulation, nevertheless i~ is incomplete since the 
optimal noncompliant policy is such that the standard is equal to zero.  However, we 
can easily find situations pf firms violating positive standards. 
One explanation for the result we obtain comes from the fact that, in the definition 
of social welfare, we  have assumed that there are no social costs associated with the 
imposition and the redistribution of fines.  If  we assume, more realistically, that these 
costs are strictly positive, then, by (3.3), this does not affect the optimal behavior of 
the agent.  However, it does affect social welfare in the event that fines  are actually 
imposed,  that is,  when  we  consider  the setting of the optimal policy that entails 
noncompliance.  In this case, the presence of social costs of collecting fines  decreases 
social welfare.  Therefore,  in the presence of sudr costs, it may be more likely that 
the optimal policy entails compliance.  But, if it continues to induce noncompliance, 
it may be the case that s· > 0,  since this implies a  reduction of the expected fines 
and, thus, a savings in the social costs of imposing them. 
Throughout this section,  we  have maintained the assumption that the planner 
has complete information concerning the agent.  In the next section, we  explore an 
alternative explanation for  the fact that firms sometimes violate positive standards: 
that the planner has imperfect information with respect to the technology of the firm. 
5. The Optimal Policy under Asymmetric Information 
In this section, we assume that the profits for the firm depend both on the pollution 
level e  ~  0, and on a parameter ()i which represents the firm's technological charac-
teristics, known only to the firm .and not to the regulator.  Let (Jib (e)  represent the 
profits for a firm of type (Ji,  where b (e)  maintains the properties assumed in Section 
2.  For simplicity, we assume that ()i can take two possible values, ()  E  {()1, ()2},  where 
o  < ()1  < (J2.  For instance, we can think of (Ji  as the degree of "dirtiness" of the firm's 
technology, where (JI stands for the clean type and (J2  for the dirty type.22  The planner 
only knows the probability distribution of the types.  Let o"l  denote the probability 
that the firm is type ()i, i  =  1, 2,  where "l > 0 and ,I +  ,,? =  1. 
As  the planner does  not know  the true type of the firm,  the regulatory policy 
cannot be based upon it.  Therefore, the planner has to design a mechanism to elicit 
the private information from the firm.  By the revelation prin:ciple, we can concentrate 
on direct revelation mechanisms in which the planner asks the firm for a report of its 
220  also represents the degree of profitability of the firm with respect to generated pollution.  We 
refer to O·as the degree of dirtiness of the firm's tech~ology to indicate that, given a policy (s,p), the 
higher 0, the higher the induced pollution level, as we will see later on. 
18 type, Oi,  and then sets the policy contingent on the report, i.e., {s (Oi) ,p (Oi)},  and 
such that the policy induces the firm to reveal its true type. 
Formally, the expected pay~ff of a firm of type (ji that reports §i  is given by the 
following expression: 
P (s (Bi)  ,p (Bi) j(i) =~:t  {Oib (e) - p (Bi) f (e - s (Bi))}  (5.1) 
where, as before, f (e - s)  is given by (2.1). 
Since the planner cannot observe the type, the firm will announce a type different 
from its true one whenever it finds it profitable to do so.  As indicated, we can restrict 
attention to incentive-compatible policies, that is,  policies that induce the agents to 
report their true types. Formally, an incentive-compatible policy satisfies the following 
property: 
(5.2) 
For convenience, we assume that if the agent is indifferent between announcing the 
t"'·o types, then it announces its true type. 
In the following Lemma, we  provide a  useful  result for the study of the optimal 
policy with asymmetric information: 
Lemma 5.1. For any feasible policy (s,p), the slope of01 's indifference curve at (s,p) 
is greater than or' equal to that of  02 'so  That is, the indifference curves for the agents' 
satisfy the "single crossing property." 
Proof.  (For analytical convenience, we  prove the resuit considering a continuum of 
types.  The result i~easily adapted to·t.he case in  which 0 take~dis.crete values.) 
Consider a feasible policy {s,p}.  The expected payoff for a firm  of type Oi  with 
respect to such a poliCy is given by the expression: 
(5.3) 
Observe that P (s,p, Oi)  is  stri~tly increasing and convex in Oi,  since,  applying 
the envelope theorem in  (5.3),  we  have P 9i (S,p,Oi) = bee) > 0 and P9i9i (S,p,Oi)  = 
b' (e) noi (s,p, Oi)  > O.  The latter result follows since nOi (s,p, Oi)  is obtained by differ-
entiating the following equation: 
Oib' (e)  = pP' (e - s)  (5.4) 
which is the first order condition for type Oi'S optimal noncompliance decision.  Thus, 
.  b'  , 
nOi (s,p,Ot) = -: 9ib l -pF" > O.  ' 
The set of policies such that a firm of type Oi  is indifferent between complying and 
not complying is now given bJ:" the expressio~:  ' 
(5.5) 
19 where 7r(S,p,Oi)  = maxe~O  {Oib(e) - pF(e - s)}.  As  in Section 3,  (5.5)  defines, for 
each Oi,  an implicit relationship between p and s, denoted by pC (s, Oi), which represents 
the minimum probability necessary to induce an agent of type Oi  to comply with the 
standard s.  Differentiating (5.5), we obtain the following: 
dp  _  b (n (s,p, Oi)) - b (s)  0 
dOi  - F  >  (5.6) 
since b' (e)  > 0 and n (s,p, Oi) =  argmaxe~o  {Oib (e) - pF (e - s)} > s. 
As  in  Section 3,  indifference curves for  the agents have an infinite slope in the 
compliance region, and they are strictly increasing and convex in the noncompliance 
region, by (3.15)  and (3.16).  Differentiating (3.15) with respect to Oi,  we have: 
d2p  F" F - (F')2  i 
dsd(Ji  Ir.=k=  (F)2  pnei  (s,p, 0) < 0  (5.7) 
since (F')2 - F F"  > 0 and nei (s,p, (Ji)  > O  .• 
In Figure 5  we  depict the result given by Lemma 5.1.  On the horizontal axis, 
we  measure the standard level.  On the vertical axis:  we  measure the probability of 
inspection.  First observe that, by (5.6),  given  a standard s,  the higher the Oi,  the 
higher the minimum probability necessary to induce the agent to comply with the 
standard. That is, the region of policies which induce noncompliance is larger for the 
dirty type than for the clean type.  Consequently, the space -of feasible policies is now 
divided into three regions.  The first is the region of full  noncompliance, which lies 
below the curve pC (S,OI).  The second is the region of.partial compliance, which lies 
between the curves pC (s, (1) and pC (s, (2), and which implies that only the clean type 
complies with the standard.  And, finally,  the third is  the region of full  compliance, 
which lies above the curve pC (s, ( 2). 
By (5.7),  the indifference curves in the full noncompliance region have a  larger 
slope for the clean type than for the dirty type.  \Ve thus have that, for the subset of 
policies that entail full noncompliance, the indifference curves for the agents satisfy 
the single crossing property. 
\Ve  restrict attention to policies which induce agents 'to reveal their true types. 
~or instance: a policy {sI, pI} for 8  =  (J1  and a policy {S2, p2}  in the shaded area for 
o  = 02 is incentive compatible.  Note that S2  < SI  and p2  ::; pI.  Observe that neither 
agent has an' incentive to lie about its type since, by Lemma 3.1, the payoff for the 
agents increases to the southeast. 
Now consider the subset of policies that entail partial compliance. In this case, 01 's 
indifference curves have an infinite slope and 02,s indifference curves have positive but 
finite slope.  Therefore, the single crossing property is  also satisfied for this subset of 
policies.  However, when we consider the subset of policies that entail full compliance, 
the indifference curves for both types have an infinite slope.  Therefore, indifference 
curves do not cross in this region.  -
20 The result we obtain here is in the same spirit as that of the tax evasion literature, 
in which the probability of inspection is nonincreasing in reported income.  Here, the 
probability of inspection must be non increasing in the announced degree of dirtiness 
of the technology, to induce agents to reveal their true types. "But, also, tlJ.e standard 
must be nonincreasing in the announced type.  " 
Once we  have  analyzed  the optimal  behavior of the types  with respect  to the 
regulatory policies, we now study the features of the optimal policy under asymmet-
ric information.  The social welfare function can be expressed as in  (4.2),  but now, 
the planner has imperfect information about the types.  Formally, the social welfare 
evaluation of an incentive compatible policy is the following: 
2 
SW (SI, s2 ,pI ,p2) = L ,·l (fib (ei) - d (ei) - pic) 
i=l 
subject to e
i  =  arg~:o'{P (Si,pi,Bi)  (5.8) 
where (SI, S2,pl ,p2) satisfies (5.2). 
Consider the possibility of announcing a pooling policy {s,p}, that is,  the same 
policy for  both types.  Trivially, this policy is  incentive compatible.  Observe that, in 
principle, pooling policies may belong to the three different regions depicted in Figure 
5. 
First, we  concentrate on  the full  noncompliance region.  In Proposition 4.1,  we 
showed that, when the planner has complete information about the type of the agent 
and the optimal policy entails noncompliance, then it is always optimal to set a zero 
standard, since this provides the maximal expected fine  and then a savings in moni-
toring costs. "'""hen the planner has imperfect information about the type of  the agent, 
we  now show that a pooling policy in the noncompliance region continues to imply 
the setting of a zero standard, but this policy is  always dominated by a  separating 
policy that implies both a higher standard and a higher probability of inspection for 
the clean type. 
Proposition 5.2.  The optimal pooling policy that in duces. full noncompliance, {s*, p*}, 
always entails the optimal standard s*  =  O.  However,  this policy is always socially 
dominated by a separating policy such that S2. = 0, p2* = p*,  and sI- > 0, ph > p*. 
Proof. Constrained to the subset of policies which induce noncompliance, the optimal 
pooling policy is the solution to the following problem: 
n;~ {t,  -I (B'b (e') - d (e') - pc)} 
su~ject to e
i  =  n (s,p, Bi)  (5.9) 
where n (s,p, Bi) =  argmaxe~o  {Bib (e) - pF  (e - s)}. 
21 We prove the first part of the proposition by contradiction. Assume that an interior 
solution to the problem (5.9) existed. The first order conditions for an interior solution 
(s*,p*)  are the following:23  . 
2 
Ll'i (rib' (ei) - d'  (ei)) np (S,p,(Ji)  =  c' 
i=1 
2 
L  I'i (rib' (ei) - d' (ei)) ns (s,p, (Ji)  =  0 
i=1 
Differentiating (Jib' (ei) - d' (ei) with respect to (Ji:  we have the following: 




Since ns (s,p, (Ji)  > 0, np (s,p, (Ji)  < 0 and (J2  > (Jl, and by (5.10), (5.11) and (5.12), 
we have that rPb' (e2) - d' (e2) > 0 and (JIb' (el )  - d
l  (el )  < 0 at the optimum. 
Now, consider the set of policies {s,p}, including the optimal policy (s*,p*),  such 
that ei  = n(s,p,(Ji)  remains constant.  This set of policies  satisfies  (5.4),  an~ for 
e
i  constant,  there exists an implicit  relationship  between sand p,  denoted pe' (s). 
Implicitly differentiating (5.4), we obtain: 
dp  F"(Zi_ S )  -
-d Izi= P F  (.  )  > 0  s  '  z' - s 
(5.13) 
Policies below the curve pe
i  (s)  are more lenient and, therefore, induce a larger e i • 
Above pe
i (s),  policies are more stringent and induce a lower ei •  By (5.13), observe· 
that, at (s·,p*), we have that ~  le2<  ~  lel, since nei (S,p,(Ji)  > 0 and Fill. =  O. 
Thus, from (s· ,p.), consider an infinitesimal decrease in both (s,p) along the curve 
pe
l  (s).  Since  ~  le2 <  ~ lel,  this new policy,  which is  cheaper since p  is  lower,  lies 
below the curve pe
2 (s), which implies that e2  increases.  But, this also increases social 
welfare, since at (s*,p*),  we have (J2b' (e2) - d' (e2) > O.  Consequently, (s*,p*)  cannot 
be optimal. This proves the first part of the Proposition.·  . 
To prove the second part, consider (5.10).  Differentiating ((Jib' (ei) - d' (ei» np (s,p, (Ji) 
wi th respect to (Ji,  we have the following: 
a~i [((Jib
l  (ei) - d' (ei)) np (s,p, (Ji)]  = 
- a~i ((Ji.b'  (ei) - d' (ei)) np (S,p,(Ji) + ((Jib' (ei) - d' (ei)) np8i (s,p,(Ji) < 0 
(5.14) 
23 As in  the previous Section, these conditions are necessary and sufficient for  characterizing the 
interior optimum, since epp (S,p,Oi)  > 0 and ess (S,p;Oi) = 0, assuming bill = 0 and Fill =  O. 
22 by (5.12), np (S,p,(}i)  < 0 and the fact that, at s = 0, npOi (s,p,(}i) = - (~~~'::;~;2 = 0, 
since both bill =  0 and Fill =  o. 
Thus, by (5.10) and (5.14), we have that, at (O,p·), ((}lb' (el) - d' (el» np (s,p, (}l)_ 
c> o.  By (5.7), the slope of the indifference curve for type (}l  at (O,p·)  is .larger than 
that for  type (}2.  Therefore, we  can increase social welfare incre'asing infinites'imally 
{s, p}  for  type (}l,  along its indifference curve, without affecting incentives to reveal 
the true types .• 
Note that, if the planner had complete information about the types, by (5.14), this 
would imply that ph > p2*  and Sh = S2.  =  O.  However, under imperfect information, 
this policy is  not incentive compa.tible.  Agent 1 would prefer to lie about its type, 
since:  by Lemma 3.1, its payoff in the noncompliance region is  strictly decreasing in 
the probability of inspection. The setting of a pooling policy in the full noncompliance 
region implies, by (5.10), that p2*  < p. < ph. Since at p., an infinitesimal increase in 
the probability of inspection for type (}l means that its private profits minus damages 
increase strictly more than the monitoring costs, social  welfare  increases if we  also 
increase infinitesimally the standard for type (}l along its indifference curve. Therefore, 
type (}l  is indifferent between this new policy and the policy (O,p·), and type (}2 strictly 
prefers the policy (O,p·)  to the new policy announced for type (}l.  Consequently, this 
new policy is incentive compatible. 
Consider now the set of policies which induce partial compliance, that is, the set 
of policies between the curves pc (s, (}l)  and pc (s, (}2).  In this region,only type (}l  is 
induced to comply with the standard.  In the following proposition, we  show that a 
pooling policy in this region is also always dominated oy a separating policy: 
Proposition 5.3.  The optimal pooling policy that entails partial compliance is al-
ways socially dominated by a separating policy that implies SI > S2  and pI  >p2. 
Proof. Constrained to the region of partial compliance, the optimal pooling policy is 
obtained solving the following problem: 
n;~'{ {t,  ~l ((}ib (e
i
)  - d (e
i
)  -pc)  } 
subject to pc (S,(}l)  :s; p < pc (S,(}2)  (5.15) 
where,  theref~re, el = s and e2 = n (s,p, (}2). 
.  \Ve may have two possibilities.  Under the optimal policy, either the, constraint in 
(5.15) does not bind or it does.  Consider the first case.  The first order conditions for 
(5.15) are the following: 
7 1 ((}lb' (s) - d' (s») +,l  ((}2b' (e2) - d' (e2)) ns (s,p, (}2)  - 0 
-c +  'Y2  ((}2b' (e2)._ d' (e2)) np (s,p, (}2)  - 0 
23 
(5.16) 
(5.17) Since np (s,p, (P)  < 0,  by (5.17)  we  have that (Pb' (e2) - d' (e2)  <  O.  Therefore, 
since ns (s,p, (J2)  > 0 and by (5.16), we obtain that BIb' (s) - d' (s)  > O.  By (5.16) and 
(5.17), we then have the following: 
(5.18) 
Therefore, there is  a gain in social welfare if we  infinitesimally increase {s, p}  for 
()l  along type ()2,s  indifference curve. 
Now, consider the case in which the restriction in (5.15) is binding.  The first order 
condition for  (5.15) is the following: 
,l  (()Ib' (s) - d' (s)) + "l (()2b' (e2)  - d' (e2)) ns (S,p,(J2) - cp~ (S,(J2)  =  0 
(5.19) 
where e2 =  n(s,p,()2). 
Observe that, by (5.19) and Lemma 3.2, we  can have either ()Ib' (s) - d' (s) > 0 or 
()lb' (s) -d' (s)  < O.  In the first case, we obtain the same conclusion as for the previous 
case in which the restriction in (5.15)  was not binding.  Therefore, there is  a social 
gain if we  infinitesimally increase {s,p} for  type (Jl  along (J2's  indifference curve.  If, 
on the contrary, ()IlJ (s) - d' (s)  < 0,  we still have two possibilities, by (5.19):  either 
()2b' (e2) - d' (e2) < 0 or ()2b' (e2) - d' (e2) > O.  In the former,  social welfare can be 
increased infinitesimally decreasing {s, p} for type (J2  along its indifference curve.24  In 
the latter, social welfare can be increased infinitesimally decreasing {s,p} for ()2  along 
()l's indifference curve .• 
Consider, finally, the case in which the optimal poli.cyinduces both types to comply 
with the standard, that is,  the policy is set on or above the curve pC (S,·()2) . . In this 
. case, we have the following: 
Proposition 5.4.  The optimal policy that entails full compliance is a pooling policy 
which lies on the curve pC (s, ()2). 
Proof.  Since  the indifference  curves for  the agents  hav~ an infinite  slope  in  the 
compliance region, the only policies that satisfy (5.2) in this region imply that SI = 82. 
Otherwise, by Lemma 3.1, one of the types would have an incentive to lie.  Now, given 
the same standard s for the two types, the agents are indifferent between any policy 
(either pooling or separating) which imply compliance with the standard. Therefore, 
the cheapest policy for the planner is the one that entails the lowest probability, which 
is pC (s, (J2)  for both types .• 
In summary, in this Section we have shown that, for the two type case, an optimal 
policy that entails either full noncompliance or partial compliance is always a sepa-
rating policy which implies both a  lower standard and probability of inspection for 
24Note that, when the optimal policy entails partial compliance, s =F  O. 
24 the dirty type.  Therefore, for  the case of full  noncompliance, it is never optimal to 
set a zero standard for all the types, as opposed to the complete infonnation model. 
For the case of partial noncompliance, we have that the dirty type always violates the 
standard. This result is quite intuitive: agents with highly polluting technologies will 
be more likely to violate environmental regulations, since the pollution level induced 
by a given policy is higher than that of a cleaner technology. 
However, the optimal policy that entails full compliance is always a pooling policy. 
Otherwise: it would induce some agent to reveal its false type.25 
The results of this Section would not substantially vary if we  allowed for  a con-
tinuum of types, instead of the two type model considered here.  Following the same 
reasoning as that of Proposition 5.3:  if the optimal  policy entailed some types  to 
comply with and others to violate the standards, the latter ones would be the dirti-
est.  ~Ioreover, the optimal policy would imply partial pooling:  the compliant types 
would be confronted to the same policy, to avoid that some agent had the incentive 
to misrepresent its type: in the same spirit as Proposition 5.4. 
An interesting question to ask now is  under what conditions we  will have the op-
timal policy in each of the regions?  \Ve  believe that: as in Section 4, the answer is 
going to depend on the convexity and the level of the sanctions, and on the monitoring 
costs.  But now: the analysis is complicated by the fact that we have more dimensions 
to the problem, namely the possible agents' different technologies as well as the likeli-
hood given by the planner to each possibility.  A formal analysis of this issue deserves 
further investigation. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have studied the setting of an optimal regulatory policy within the 
principal-agent  framework,  where  a  policy is  composed of pollution standards and 
probabilities of inspecting firms'  behavior.  We  have considered that, when  agents 
are found  to be violating the standards: they are forced to pay a  sanction, strictly 
increasing and convex in the degree of violation. The approach followed in the paper is 
different from that which has been done in the literature, since we have considered the 
full range of policies, that is, those which induce agents to comply with the standards 
and also those that entail noncompliance. 
25If we assumed that private profits for  the agents have an interior maximum, namely et  and t-2 
for types (jI and 02, respectively, the result would vary if the optimal pooling policy implied s· > et. 
?ince, as we pointed out in Section 3, type 01 is indifferent between any policy with a standard equal 
to f1  or higher, it would be socially preferable, in this case, to announce, for type 01,  Si = et  and 
the probability such that type 02  is indifferent bet",,·een the former pooling policy and this new policy 
announc~  for type 01•  Therefore, in this case we would have Si < s2 and pi < p2. The latter follows 
since agents' indifference curves are strictly increasing in the noncompliance region.  For all the other 
cases, the same results are preserved with this alternative assumption.  . 
25 The model that  'we have studied is able to explain salient features of environmental 
regulation.  "Ve have demonstrated that the optimal policy can entail either compliance 
or noncompliance with the standards,  depending on the monitoring costs and the 
degree of convexity and the level of the sanctions.  In contrast to previous literature, 
we have shown that when sanctions are strictly convex in the degree of noncompliance, 
it may be more likely that we find noncompliance with the standards when sanctions 
are high  than when  sanctions are low.  The model  also explains  the feature  that 
firms do violate positive standards, when we consider that the planner has imperfect 
information about the technology that firms use. 
Several extensions of our study are possible.  For instance, we  have assumed that 
inspections are perfectly accurate:  However, the degree of accuracy of a  monitoring 
process  depends on its cost:  the more resources  devoted to monitoring,  the more 
perfect the measurement of pollution.  This may affect the optimal policy as well as 
the agents' response to the policy.  It may be interesting to endogenize the optimal 
degree of accuracy of the monitoring policy. 
As mentioned in Section 2, the problem of fully determining the optimal standards, 
probabilities of inspection and fines  has not been solved.  This may be, indeed, an 
interesting problem to look at, considering the full  range of policies,  that is,  those 
which entail compliance and those which induce noncompliance. \Ve believe that juries 
may play an important role in the determination of the optimal sanctions: since, by 
law:  agents are  "protected"  by them.  The influence of the juries should, then,  be. 
considered in determining the optimal policy. 
'Ye could have considered an alternative framework.  In some contexts, such as 
tax e,"asion:  the principal-agent framework may be appropriate,  since  agents have 
almost  no bargaining power  ..  However,  in the contE:xt  of epvironmental regulation, 
firms' power may be noticeable:  for instance, they choose production technologies to 
be "cleaner" or "dirtier" within an admissible range.  Environmental regulations may 
well be the result of cooperative agreements between regulators and firms.  It may be 
possible that relaxed regulations result, including reductions of the expected fines for 
noncompliance with the environmental standards. 
All these issues are left for future research. 
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